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RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent Celia Tipton raises jurisdictional, equitable, 
and legal objections to this appeal. Jurisdictionally, the 
present appeal is untimely. Equitably, a variety of doctrines 
and principles should operate so as to deny Appellant any relief 
whatsoever. Legally, abundant authority supports repeated 
decisions, in Respondent's favor, by the Court Commissioner, 
Sandra Peuler, and the trial judge, the Honorable James 
S. Sawaya. 
Respondent denies many of the statements of fact made in 
Appellant's brief without any reference to the record on appeal 
("R.") or the reporter's transcript ("R.T.") of hearings before 
Judge Sawaya. Even though limitations of time and length 
preclude Respondent from listing, and disproving, each and every 
assertion of fact from Appellant's Brief which is not supported 
in the record, Respondent's failure to specifically deny one or 
more such "statements of fact" should not be interpreted as 
agreement to the same. 
A related problem is the fault of both parties, and hinders 
the ability of this Court to conduct an effective review. As 
reflected from the very beginning of the reporter's transcript 
(See, R.T. p.3, lines 10-18 and R.T. p.4, lines 6-7), packages of 
documentary evidence, lists of issues, and other materials were 
submitted to Judge Sawaya at the April 5, 1985 "trial" in this 
matter. All the "evidence" upon which Judge Sawaya ruled 
consisted of proffered testimony and documentary evidence—almost 
none of which is found in the record before this Court. The 
packages of materials prepared, and used by both parties at the 
April 5, 1985 "trial", were never included as part of the 
official clerk's record. Respondent feels herself powerless to 
remedy the defect at this point and refuses to shoulder a burden 
which is properly placed upon the Appellant. (See e.g., 4 
Am. Jur. 2d "Appeal and Error", Section 409, p.87. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE PRESENT APPEAL IS UNTIMELY 
In considering the jurisdiction of this Court to hear Monte 
Tipton's Appeal, the Addendum contains an abbreviated chronology 
of events and orders to show that the appeal is untimely. 
The events from May 9, 1985 are particularly significant. 
Both the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Order 
relating to the same, which are the principle subject of this 
Appeal, were entered by Judge Sawaya on May 9, 1985. Appellant's 
May 20 Motion for New Trial, etc. tolled the time for appeal from 
Judge Sawaya's Order, Findings and Conclusions (U.R.A.P. 4b). 
Following a hearing before Judge Sawaya on the Motion for 
New Trial, etc. (R.T. 51-60), Judge Sawaya executed and entered 
his Order denying Appellant's various motions. That Order 
(R. 13 6) was entered by the court clerk in the docket sheet on 
September 23, 1985 and mailed to all counsel. It contained no 
directions for any party to prepare another order for the court, 
nor were findings and conclusions necessary. As recognized in 
U.R.C.P. 58 A(c) "A judgment is complete and shall be deemed 
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entered for all purposes, except the creation of a lien on real 
property, when the same is signed and filed as herein provided." 
As Rule 54 (a) notes, the term "'judgment1... includes a decree 
and any order from which an appeal lies." Entry of Judge 
Sawaya's order on 9-23-85 commenced the running of Monte Tipton's 
time to appeal (U.R.A.P. 4b: "The time for appeal for all 
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial 
or granting or denying any such other motion."). 
Appellant himself recognized the appealability of Judge 
Sawaya's September 23, 1985 order in his first Notice of Appeal 
(R. 144) filed months later--on 4-19-86. By that time, 
Appellant's right to appeal had already expired (U.R.A.P. 4). 
Respondent's filing of a redundant and duplicative Order on 
5-2 0-8 6 (R. 149) did not serve to extend the time to appeal. 
As recognized in Larsen v. Larsen 657 P. 2d 1350, 1351 (Utah 
1983), a case involving duplicative, and redundant, judgments, 
the time for appeal runs from the first judgment or order. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING AND ORDER THAT APPELLANT AND 
RESPONDENT WERE NOT PARTNERS WERE CORRECT 
A. Judge Sawaya's Finding Concerning the Partnership Issue 
was Entirely Adequate in Light of the Limited Evidence Before the 
Court. 
Given the absence of affirmative evidence by Appellant, the 
trial court's finding concerning partnership should stand. The 
effective limits upon a trial judge's findings or conclusions are 
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well known. Parks v. Zions First Nat. Bank, 673 P. 2d 590, 601 
(Utah 1983), noted: 
Upon reviewing the pleadings, the evidence and the 
findings of fact in this matter, we conclude that, 
although the findings with respect to the issues 
delineated under this particular point are not as full 
and complete as might be desired, they do ascertain the 
ultimate facts and sufficiently conform to the plead-
ings and the evidence supporting the judgment... 
* * * * 
Substantial compliance with Rule 52(a) does not, 
however, require that the trial court negative every 
allegation contained in the pleadings; rather the Rule 
is satisfied if, from the finding it [the trial court] 
makes, there can be no reasonable inference other than 
that it must have found against such allegations. 
Of equal import is the decision of Pearson v. Pearson 561 
P.2d 1080, 1082 (Utah 1977): 
Findings of fact and conclusions of law will support a 
judgment, though they are very general, where they in 
most respects follow the allegation of the pleadings. 
Findings should be limited to the ultimate facts and if 
they ascertain ultimate facts, and sufficiently conform 
to the pleadings and the evidence to support the 
judgement, they will be regarded as sufficient, though 
not as full and complete as might be desired. 
B. Appellant Failed to Produce at Trial Adequate Evidence 
to Support the Existence of a Partnership Between the Parties. 
At the "trial11 of this matter, Appellant's evidence that a 
partnership existed between himself and Respondent consisted of 
the following proffer by Appellantfs counsel before Judge Sawaya 
(R.T. p.23 Line 9-22): 
Now, the issue of partnership shares has been brought 
up. I refer to Mr. McKeown's schematic drawing of the 
Wine Cup Ranch partnership which we do not agree with. 
In the first place, I am led to believe in the Wine Cup 
Ranch partnership—I don't have any documents either, 
your Honor, but I don't think there necessarily have to 
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be documents. I think that Plaintiff is, if nothing 
else, she is a de facto general partner by virtue of 
the fact that not only did she enter into the stipula-
tion and settlement agreement accepting a fifty-percent 
partnership share, but also by accepting and filing-
-that was given to her there with a K-l form which is 
to be filed by partners in the partnership. She did, 
it is my understanding, filed those K-l forms out of 
the distributed share from the fall of 1981 or previ-
ously. 
Respondent's proof of the non-existence of a fact was 
necessarily limited. In the first place, Respondent's counsel 
proffered her denial that she was a partner or that a partnership 
existed, and further denied possession of any documentation, pro 
or con, on the subject (R.T. p.17 Lines 8-22). Respondent 
further denied any intentional action which would make her a 
partner. (R.T. p. 26, Line 22, p. 27, Line 12): 
The concept of the de facto general partnership is one 
that is difficult for me to handle. A partnership 
requires acquiescence by partners. It is not something 
that occurs spontaneously. It is not something that 
occurs by order of the Court. What the Court has to 
deal with is property distribution. I don't think that 
by implication or otherwise the Court can require that 
Celia become a general partner in a property or in any 
partnership of any kind. It's her impression that she 
never signed a partnership agreement. I think that is 
refuted but nothing has been produced to indicate that 
she did. It is our position that she is not in fact a 
partner, in fact, upon receipt of a K-l for 1983, the 
first tax year, she received a K-l. She indicated that 
she felt she was not a partner and subsequent to that 
we have written a letter to the other general partner, 
Darrell Christensen, indicating we do not believe she 
is a partner. To date, she has not received a K-l for 
the 1984 tax year. 
Judge Sawaya, faced with a totally inadequate showing by 
Appellant, gave the partnership "issue" all the attention it 
deserved in his findings and conclusions. Just as Appellant now 
places this Court in the impractical position of attempting to 
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review issues without a complete record, the Appellant placed 
Judge Sawaya in the position of resolving issues upon which no 
affirmative evidence could be found. 
In considering the lack of evidence to support Appellant's 
claim that a partnership existed, the practical effect of this 
issue should be kept in mind. As reflected in the abbreviated 
chronology (Addendum), Appellant, through his counsel, prepared 
and executed a stipulation containing the very property distribu-
tion provisions of which he now complains. 
Presumably, Appellant drafted his proposed contract with 
Respondent in such a fashion as to obtain every reasonable 
advantage. As discussed in Part III B below, Respondent consid-
ered the tax consequences of the proposed stipulation with her 
counsel and her accountant. Appellant's disregard of potential 
tax consequences, entirely in keeping with his past history of 
controversy with the Internal Revenue Service, led to his 
discovery that the agreement which he drafted and requested 
Respondent to execute bore unfavorable tax consequences. Facing 
the very loss which Judge Sawaya found Appellant could have 
avoided (R. 16, Finding 2), Appellant pressed the inventive 
argument that the effect of the property settlement provisions 
was to make Respondent a partner with the Appellant. In consid-
ering the existence of a partnership between the parties, the 
absence of a presumption in favor of such a finding, and the 
burden of proof upon the Appellant, is clear: 
The existence of a partnership will not be presumed, 
but must be proved... In accord with the general 
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principle that the burden of proof to establish the 
affirmative of an issue involved in an action rests 
upon the party alleging the facts constituting that 
issue, the burden of proving the existence of a 
partnership is ordinarily on him who alleges and relies 
on the fact of its existence and this rule applies to 
one who alleges a partnership by estoppel as well as to 
one who attempts to establish a partnership as between 
the parties to the action. 59 Am. Jur. 2d, "Partner-
ship", Section 80, p. 993-994. 
In this regard, the lack of any written partnership agree-
ment or other documentary evidence initiated by the Respondent 
is significant. The New York Supreme Court ruled in Hanlon 
v. Melfi. 423 N.Y.S. 2d 132, 134 (N.Y.Sup. Ct. 1979): 
A partnership is an association of two or more persons 
to place their money, efforts, labor or skill, or some 
or all of these in lawful commerce for business and to 
divide the profits and bear the loss in certain 
proportions (citation omitted). The fact that there is 
no written agreement of partnership is not conclusive 
in determining whether or not a partnership exists but 
it is an element to be taken into serious consideration 
in determining where the thrust of the controversy is. 
Where no partnership agreement is executed in writing 
by the parties, it must be determined from the testi-
mony, from the conduct of the parties, and especially 
from the documentary evidence, whether or not a 
partnership existed. The burden, of course, of 
establishing the existence of an oral partnership by a 
fair preponderance of the credible evidence rests upon 
the party claiming the partnership (citation omitted). 
It has further been held that an indispensable require-
ment of a partnership is a mutual promise or under-
standing of the parties to share in the profits of the 
business and submit to the burden of making good the 
losses. (citations omitted). 
Appellant's bald assertion that a property settlement 
provision creates a partnership between himself and his former 
strains credulity. What "efforts, labor or skill" were to 
be contributed to this partnership by the Respondent? The 
property settlement provision in question speaks of a distribu-
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tion of monies to be generated from a note, but what about a 
distribution of losses? What is the venture that this supposed 
partnership is engaged in? The only evidence before Judge Sawaya 
was that the proceeds of a particular fund were to be divided 
according to a set formula. The division of monies owed under a 
note does not constitute "a share of the proceeds of a business11 
as defined by Section 48-1-4(4), Utah Code Annotated. 
The Uniform Partnership Act provides that the receipt 
by a person of a share of the profits of a business is 
prima facie evidence that he is a partner of the 
business, unless such profits were received in payment 
of a debt... 
The Uniform Partnership Act formulation is in accord 
with earlier law, and it is undisputed that participa-
tion in profits is prima facie evidence that the person 
receiving a share of the profits is a partner. But the 
presumption of partnership arising from a participation 
of profits may be rebutted, and outweighed by other 
evidence or circumstance. The presumption has been 
said to operate only in the absence of invalidating 
evidence, and to evaporate in the face of 'substantial 
evidence.1 59 Am. Jur. 2d, "Partnership", Section 50 
p.970. 
Still additional critical elements are missing from 
Appellant's claim of partnership. For example, there was no 
evidence before Judge Sawaya as to the power or control which 
Respondent could exercise. 
The degree to which a creditor may control the business 
of his Debtor may be the determining factor in deciding 
whether a partnership exists. When a creditor exer-
cises no more control than is required for the protec-
tion of a loan, no partnership will generally be held 
to exist. Id, Section 55, p. 970. 
Respondent respectfully submits the trial court's conclusion 
was inescapable. Since the parties' joint involvement was 
limited to a single transaction, the payment of a debt through 
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division of proceeds from a note, not an on-going business 
venture (Cf. Koesling v. Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043, 1045 (Utah 
1975), since Celia Tipton contributed neither property nor 
services (Cf. Kimball v. McCornick, 259 P. 313, 314 (Utah 1927), 
and since there was no meeting of the minds on a business, orally 
or in writing, (Cf. Johanson Brothers Builders v. Board of 
Review, Industrial Commission, P.2d 563, 567 (Utah 1950), Judge 
Sawaya appropriately rejected Appellant's partnership claim as an 
afterthought induced by his continued difficulty with the IRS. 
Appellant's claims of "estoppel" (See Appellant's Brief, 
p. 19) and of detrimental reliance upon acts or representations 
by the Respondent, is without any support in either the report-
er's transcript or any other portion of the record. For this 
reason, Respondent respectfully requests that this court ignore 
all assertions for claims which the Appellant cannot support with 
appropriate references to the record. 
III. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE APPROPRIATE REFUSED TO MODIFY THE PARTIES' DECREE 
OF DIVORCE 
A. Judcre Sawaya's Ruling was Supported by Adequate 
Findings. 
With respect to the issue of written findings, the 
Respondent hereby incorporates by reference its previous discus-
sion found in Part II A. Again, the sparsity of the t r ial 
court's findings was effectively mandated by Appellant's own 
inabili ty to present evidence in support of his position. 
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B. No Relevant Evidence to Support Appellant's Claim of 
Changed Circumstances Was Presented to the Trial Judge, 
Preliminarily, the standard applicable to a showing a 
changed circumstances with respect to property settlements, 
especially those involving real property, was stated in Foulcrer 
v, Foulqer, 626 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1981): 
The change in circumstance required to justify a 
modification of the Decree of Divorce varies with the 
type of modification contemplated... Where a disposi-
tion of real property is in question however, the court 
should properly be more reluctant to grant a modifica-
tion. In the interest of securing stability of 
titles, modifications in a decree of divorce, making 
distribution of real property, are to be granted only 
upon a showing of compelling reasons arising from a 
substantial and material change of circumstances. 
The above holds true a fortiori where the property 
disposition is the product of an agreement and stipula-
tion between the parties, and sanctioned by the trial 
court. Such a provision is the product of an agreement 
bargained for by the parties. As such, a trial court 
should subsequently modify such a provision only with 
great reluctance, and based upon compelling reason. 
Absent such substantial change, the decree cannot be collaterally 
attacked due to the doctrine of res judicata. Kessimakis 
v. Kessimakis, 580 P.2d 1090, 1091 (Utah 1978). 
A review of the proffered testimony before Judge Sawaya at 
the April 5, 1985 "trial" disproves Appellant's claim that his 
tax liability could not have been know or even guessed at. 
Parenthetically, it should be observed the Respondent engaged 
her own tax expert to advise her as to the tax consequences of 
the proposed property settlement stipulation (R.T. p. 13, lines 
14-19.) In addition, well known Utah authorities have spoken of 
the need to consider the tax consequences of marital property 
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settlements for some time. The following excerpt from the 
Summary of Utah Family Law, Journal of Legal Studies, (1980) 
B.Y.U., Section 12.18, p. 311, is illustrative: 
The tax consequences of the property settlement need to 
be analyzed carefully. Alimony is often taxable to 
recipient and deductible to the payor. Division of 
the marital estate may give rise to a tax liability 
because of the liquidation of the assets. In some 
situations, transfer of assets between spouses upon 
divorce may trigger a taxable event. An award of real 
property will normally include a corresponding property 
tax obligation. 
Appellant's failure to consider these matters is rendered 
even more inexcusable in light of his admitted history of 
controversy with the Internal Revenue Service. At the trial, 
Appellant admitted disputes with the IRS years before Appellant 
proposed the property settlement agreement which he now would 
like to re-write: 
Now, there is another circumstance that Mr. Tipton 
would testify, to, and that is that he had previous 
problems with the Internal Revenue Service because of 
the nature of his business and I will try to give the 
Court an outline a little later on if I can. Right now 
let me state that in 1980 Mr. Tipton settled with the 
Internal Revenue Service a $271,000 claim they had 
against him for $162,000... (R.T. p. 20, lines 7-14). 
Immediately before this, Appellant's counsel proffered Monte 
Tipton's testimony concerning the certified public accountants 
who he had been working with since 1982. (R.T. p.19, Lines 8-23. 
Although, at the time of trial, Appellant claimed that the 
medical problems of one of his accountants delayed preparation of 
his tax return preparations, there was no proffer of testimony 
that Mr. Tipton was unable to find another competent accountant, 
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or was otherwise prevented from attending to his tax obliga-
tions. 
Appellant's proffered testimony was that at the time that he 
proposed the property settlement agreement to Celia Tipton, he 
was aware of tax consequences, generally, and believed that he 
was taking care of them: 
But in any event, during 1978 through 1982, he (Monte 
Tipton) continued to accrue certain tax liabilities 
which he in his own mind felt he was taking care of by 
investment tax credits and other vehicles. 
(R.T. p. 21, lines 2-5.) 
C. Principles of Compromise Should Apply So As To Deny 
Modification in This Case. 
The Stipulation and Settlement Agreement prepared by 
Appellant's counsel (R. 7-14.) included provisions concerning 
property settlement that, according to paragraph 9 thereof, were 
intended to be "complete and final." In paragraph 11 thereof, 
both parties declared: 
It is understood and agreed to by the parties hereto 
that this agreement constitutes a complete, fair and 
equitable settlement of any claims the Plaintiff Celia 
Sherwood Tipton has or may have against any and all 
property, whether the same be real or personal, owned 
by Defendant Monte D. Tipton or which Defendant Monte 
D. Tipton may have an interest... 
The provisions of paragraphs 13 and 14, cited below, 
highlighted the fact that both parties understood that they were 
agreeing to compromise all claims that they might have had 
against the other: 
It is understood by both parties that Plaintiff's 
claims against all property, real or personal, owed by 
Defendant, prior to, during, or subsequent to the 
parties' marriage, are disputed and that the instant 
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agreement is entered into for the purpose of settling 
all such dispute claims... 
Both parties enter this agreement of their own free 
will and choice, and assert that they do so willingly 
and that they are fully aware of the ramifications of 
this agreement... 
Through careful draftsmanship of that agreement, Appellant 
protected himself against any subsequent claims by the Respondent 
to his real or personal assets. Respondent was precluded, by the 
agreement, from asserting that she did not understanding the 
ramifications of the settlement. Respondent was prevented from 
asserting that she did not know the nature or extent of 
Appellant's assets. Respondent was required to certify that she 
was not under any form of adverse influence. Now, facing the 
consequences of his own negligence and failure to prepare against 
the tax consequences of the exact agreement which he drafted, the 
Appellant desires to re-write the contract. Under Hornbook 
principles relating to the public policy behind settlement 
agreements, and their effect, Appellant's request should be 
denied. 
The law favors the resolution of controversies and 
uncertainties through compromise and settlement rather 
than through litigation, and it is the policy of the 
law to uphold and enforce such contracts if they are 
fairly made and are not in contradiction of some law or 
public policy. Am. Jur. 2d, "Compromise and Settle-
ment", Section 5, p. 777. 
Once the parties have entered into an agreement 
settling a disputed claim, neither party will, in the 
absence of any element of fraud or bad faith, be 
permitted to repudiate it. Id, Section 7, p.779. 
Indeed, a principle related to the concept of compromise and 
settlement provides that the acceptance of the benefits of a 
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decree precludes a party from appealing the same: 
A party who accepts an award or legal advantage under 
an order, judgment or decree, ordinarily waives his 
right to any such review of the adjudication as may 
again put in issue his right to the benefit which he 
has accepted. This is so even though the judgment, 
decree or order may have been generally unfavorable to 
the Appellant. Whether a party who accepted benefits 
under a judgment actually intended to waive his right 
to appeal is, as a general rule, immaterial. 4 
Am. Jur. 2d, "Appeal and Error," Section 250, 
pp. 745-746. 
Appellant's tardy discovery that he had miscalculated his 
tax obligations is no reason to excuse him from his own agree-
ment. 
D. Principles of Contract Construction and Equity Support-
ed Denial of Appellant's Request for Modification. 
1. Uncertain or ambiguous provisions should be construed 
against the drafter. 
The settlement agreement incorporated in the Decree of 
Divorce provided that Respondent should receive "a fifty per cent 
(50%) partnership share of the balance due to the parties hereto 
from the Sierra Pacific note..." (R. 11, p. 4, paragraph 9 (c). 
paragraph 9 (c). Any ambiguity should be construed against 
Appellant as the drafter of the Agreement. The rule and rational 
is well explained in the Restatement of Contracts, Second, 
Section 206: 
In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise 
or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is 
generally preferred which operates against the party 
who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise 
proceeds. Comment: a. Rationale. Where one party 
chooses the terms of a contract, he is likely to 
provide more carefully for the protection of his own 
interests than for those of the other party. He is 
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also more likely than the other party to have reason to 
know of uncertainties of meaning. Indeed, he may leave 
meaning deliberately obscure, intending to decide at a 
later date what meaning to assert. In cases of doubt, 
therefore, so long as other factors are not decisive, 
there is substantial reason for preferring the meaning 
of the other party. 
This rule, sometimes referred to as interpretation "contra 
proferentem", was noted by this Court in Seal v. Tayco, Inc., 
400 P. 2d 503, 505 (Utah 1965). See also, Corbin on Contracts, 
Section 559, p. 262 (West 1960). 
2. As between the two parties to the agreement, Appellant 
should bear the loss 
It is an equitable principle that where litigants 
assert conflicting claims, and hence, loss or prejudice 
must be born by one of them, the decision in the event 
that they are shown to have been equally 
•innocent1—that is, ignorant of the harmful conse-
quences of their acts—must be rendered against the 
party whose conduct brought about the prejudicial 
situation. In this respect it is frequently said that 
where one of two innocent parties must suffer, he 
through his agency the loss occurred must bear it. 
Similarly, it is often said that where one of two 
parties, both guiltless of intentional wrong, must 
suffer a loss, the one whose conduct, act, or omission 
occasions the loss, must stand the consequences. 27 
Am. Jur. 2d "Equity", Section 146, pp. 682-683. 
This doctrine was adopted long ago by this Court in such 
cases as Twiggs v. The State Board of Land C'rs, 75 P. 729 (Utah 
1904) . 
3. Modification of a property settlement contract should 
not be permitted for unilateral mistake. 
At no time has Respondent asserted that she was operating 
under a mistake of fact as to the settlement agreement, or the 
tax consequences thereto. Rather, as Judge Sawaya learned, 
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(R.T. 13, lines 14-19), Respondent commissioned a tax expert to 
advise her, in advance, of the tax consequences she would face 
from the proposed property settlement. 
Recently, a Colorado appellate court was called upon to 
decide whether a United States Tax Court determination adverse to 
the husband with respect to the payment of maintenance was 
sufficient grounds to modify a maintenance and property settle-
ment agreement. Re Marriage of Hall. 681 P. 2d 543 
(Colo. App. 1984). After considering rules relating to the 
interpretation of contracts, as well as the existence of a valid 
11
 integration clause" (substantially identical with the one 
drafted by the Appellant R. 14, Par. 25) the Colorado Court ruled 
as follows: 
Where no question of fraud, bad faith or inequitable 
conduct is involved, and the claim of a right to reform 
a contract is [based] solely on a mistake, it is 
absolutely necessary that the mistake be mutual, and 
that both parties understood the contract to be 
different from what it shows on its face, and that the 
interest of the contract would have been different 
except for a mistake. (citation omitted). A party's 
prediction or judgment as to events to occur in the 
future, even if erroneous, is not a 'mistake1 for the 
purpose of making a contract voidable. Restatement 
Second of Contracts, Section 151c. 
4. Appellant was guilty of unclean hands in connection 
with this lawsuit 
A serious matter raised by Respondent in the trial before 
Judge Sawaya on April 5, 1985 involved the forgery of the 
Respondent's signature on a 1979 federal income tax return 
prepared and filed by Appellant in 1982. Respondent proffered 
her personal denial that she signed the tax return in question as 
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well as the documentary and expert testimony of Robert F. Grubby, 
a questioned documents examiner. Although the detarls of 
Mr. Grubbyfs qualifications and analysis constitute a small part 
of the numerous papers not before this court, as discussed above, 
clear evidence of a forgery was proffered. (R.T. p. 12, line 12 
to p. 13, line 13) and R.T. p. 26, lines 5-19) 
The forgery of Respondent's signature to a joint tax return 
was a fraudulent act resorted to by Appellant in a desperate 
attempt to minimize his tax liability. Appellant had no right to 
sign her name without consent. 
To qualify for the filing of a joint income tax return, 
tax payers must meet statutory requirements as estab-
lished in I.R.C. Section 6013. The first of those 
requirements is that the tax payers must be married. 
The second is that they make the election to file 
jointly. Summary of Utah Family Law, Supra, Section 
25.3 p. 649. 
As previously indicated, Respondent repeatedly denied signing 
the return for 1979 taxes and had filed separate tax returns for 
the period in question (R.T. p.13, lines 11-13.). 
Appellant has sought relief from both the trial court, and 
of this Court, on the basis of equity. Where an Appellant 
is guilty of unclean hands, he has disqualified himself from any 
such relief. 
It is inherent in the nature and purpose of equity that 
it will grant relief only when fairness and good 
conscience so demand. Correlated to this is the 
precept that equity does not reward one who has engaged 
in fraud or deceit in the business under consideration, 
but reserves its rewards for those who are themselves 
acting in fairness and good conscience, or as is 
sometimes said, to those who have come into Court with 
clean hands. Jacobson v. Jacobson 557 P. 2d 156, 158 
(Utah 1976). 
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The conduct of which Respondent complains is closely related 
to the very transaction and form of relief at issue. Appellant 
claims that he is entitled to a modification of his own property 
settlement agreement on the grounds that the tax consequences 
thereof are operating to his disadvantage. However, having 
forged Respondent's signature, and having advanced a false 
and fraudulent tax return to the Internal Revenue Service, 
Appellant should be denied relief. 
IV. 
JUDGE SAWAYA CORRECTLY DECLINED TO MODIFY APPELLANT'S 
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT DECREE ON THE BASIS OF ADVERSE TAX 
CONSEQUENCES 
Relevant provisions of the divorce decree include the 
following: 
(a) Appellant Monte Tipton was ordered to assume and pay 
all his own obligations and debts since separation. (R. 27, 
p. 11); 
(b) Appellant Monte Tipton was ordered to pay all joint 
debts "prior to May 1, 1982, which are not specified herein 
and shall hold Plaintiff harmless therefrom.11 (R. 27, p. 12); 
(c) All other claims whether known or unknown were expres-
sly deemed waived by each party against the other. (R. 27-28 
par. 13). 
In connection with the express waiver provisions noted 
above, Respondent's counsel included, as part of the package of 
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material presented to the trial judge, a letter from Appellant's 
counsel described in the Reporter's Transcript (p. 11, lines 
8-15) as follows: 
...I have enclosed a letter which I received from 
Mr. Guyon on February 17. It was sent on February 17 
which specifically requests the language indicating 
that all claims of any nature whatsoever that either 
may have are deemed waived, and consequently, I would 
indicate that I responded by including that and that at 
that point in time Mr. Guyon approved the decree and we 
submitted it to the Court. 
Additional evidence, concerning the parties' intent, never 
contradicted in any fashion at the trial, is found with respect 
to paragraph 2 3 of the "Stipulation and Settlement Agreement" 
prepared by Appellant's counsel. (R. 13-14, par. 23). 
That paragraph says that the parties warned that they 
have not incurred any debt or made any commitment for 
which the other party or his or her estate may be 
liable other than those debts or commitments heretofore 
disclosed. It was the intent of the parties, I would 
indicate, that all debts were disclosed and that 
Mr. Tipton was. to have assumed liability for all joint 
debts. (R.T. p. 11, line 21 to p. 12, line 3). 
Although Respondent is not aware of any Utah decisions which 
even approximate the case before this Court, Mr. Justice Traynor 
of the California Supreme Court authored a carefully reasoned 
examination of the issue of modification of a property settlement 
decree on the basis of subsequently discovered tax liability. 
In Kulchar v. Kulchar 462 P. 2d 17, 20 (Cal 1969), Mr. Justice 
Traynor considered what kinds of mistake justify modification of 
property settlements: 
Moreover, a mutual mistake that might be sufficient to 
set aside a contract is not sufficient to set aside a 
final judgment. The principles of res judicata demand 
that the parties present their entire case in one 
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proceeding. 'Public policy requires that pressure be 
brought upon litigants to use great care in preparing 
cases for trial and in ascertaining all the facts. A 
rule which would permit the re-opening of cases 
previously decided because of error or ignorance during 
the progress of the trial would in a large measure 
vitiate the effects of the rules of res judicata. f 
(Rest. , Judgments, Section 12 6, com. a). Courts deny 
relief, therefore, when the fraud or mistake is 
•intrinsic1; that is, when it 'goes to the merits of 
the prior proceedings, which should have been guarded 
against by the Plaintiff at that time. » (Citations 
omitted.) 
Significantly, in Kulchar., both parties agreed that a 
mistake had been made as to the tax consequences of their 
property settlement agreement. In our case, however, Respondent 
has repeatedly denied that any mistake occurred. How much more 
applicable, in our case, are the words of Mr. Justice Traynor in 
Kulchar, supra, at 21: "Relief is also denied when the complain-
ing party has contributed to the fraud or mistake, giving rise to 
the judgment thus obtained." Noting that data concerning tax 
considerations existed at the time of trial, the California 
Supreme Court reversed a trial court order modifying the divorce 
decree so as to relieve the Defendant husband of liability to pay 
federal income taxes: 
In the present case both parties knew of the New 
Zealand assets, but the husband and his attorney chose 
not to investigate their taxability. The property 
settlement agreement expressly covered unknown tax 
liability. Having had full opportunity to consider all 
income of the wife and its concurrent tax consequences, 
the husband cannot now complain of the added tax 
burden. (Kulchar, supra. at 22.) 
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V. 
APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR A NEW TRIAL WAS PROPERLY DENIED 
The final major argument of Monte Tipton's appeal is the 
alleged reversible error committed by Judge Sawaya in his denial 
of Appellant's Motion for New Trial, etc. The first matter 
raised by Appellant with respect to the Motion for New Trial was 
that the Court's ruling, without findings, constituted a viola-
tion of Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This argument 
merits little attention. A motion for a new trial is not a trial 
on the merits requiring findings and conclusions. Indeed, as 
this Court recognized in Wright v. Union Pac. R. Co. , 62 P. 317 
(Utah 1902), findings on a Motion for New Trial are neither 
necessary nor usual. 
The basis for the Motion for New Trial was stated in the 
Motion itself (R.123) as "irregularity in the proceedings" 
(par. 1), specifically, "intentional misrepresentations" by 
the Plaintiff Celia Tipton (R. 124, Par. 2), and the discovery of 
previously unknown evidence (R.124, Par. 3). At the hearing 
before Judge Sawaya, Appellant's counsel placed great emphasis 
upon the "Acknowledgement of Obligation to Pay Tax" (R. 130) 
signed by Respondent Celia Sherwood Tipton: 
That's why we are asking for a new trial. We feel that 
this acknowledgement of tax liability was specifically 
kept from us. We had no way of finding this informa-
tion and it was not brought to the Court's attention by 
Plaintiff, of course, because it would have hurt her 
case at the time. (R.T. P. 53, lines 10-15). 
Notwithstanding this serious assertion, careful examination 
of the record contradicts Appellant's claims that (1) Celia 
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Tipton concealed the document, and (2) the document was not 
available to Monte Tipton upon an exercise of due diligence. 
Speaking for both himself and his client, Respondent's attorney-
represented to the trial judge that neither he nor his client 
concealed the document. 
Again, this document was apparently available at the 
time of the hearing but was not found by anybody. We 
were unaware of it. We see it for the first time as a 
part of this motion. Again, Mrs. Sherwood (Tipton) 
does recognize that she signed the document at the time 
that she made the first distribution. I think it is 
consistent, entirely consistent with the testimony that 
was proffered at trial in terms of her partnership 
interest and the fact that she was not a partner. 
(R.T. p. 57, lines 3-11). 
Respondent's explanation of the document, paragraph by paragraph, 
(R.T. p. 56, line 1 to p. 57, line 3) was apparently full and 
complete to the trial judge. 
Following such testimony, counsel for the Appellant again 
addressed the issue, but provided no evidence in support of the 
claim that the document in question could not have been discover-
ed, or that said document had been intentionally withheld by his 
opponent or the opposing client. Again, this is yet another 
situation where an assertion of fact is made without any basis 
for support in the record. There is no evidence of concealment 
of documents. There is no testimony by Appellant of the efforts 
which he made, prior to "trial", to discover the document in 
question. There is no evidence as to the fashion in which the 
document was eventually discovered. There is no evidence of 
the circumstances under which the document was found. The 
document itself is dated weeks before the trial and a month 
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before the motion for a new trial. Under these circumstances, 
the grievous, yet unsupported, assertion of impropriety by 
Respondent is unmerited. 
This Court has repeated the elements of proof necessary to 
support a motion for new trial on the grounds of newly discovered 
evidence since the last century. In Klopenstine v. Hays, 57 
P. 712, 714 (Utah 1899) these principles were detailed: 
It is well settled that, to entitle a defeated party 
to a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered 
evidence, it must appear (1) that he used reasonable 
diligence to discover and produce at the former trial 
the newly-discovered evidence, and that his failure to 
do so was not the result of his own negligence; (2) 
that the newly-discovered evidence is not simply 
cumulative; (3) that such evidence is not sufficient if 
it simply be to impeach an adverse witness. (4) It 
must be material to the issues, and so important as to 
satisfy the Court, by reasonable inference, that the 
verdict or judgment would have been different if the 
newly-discovered evidence had been introduced on the 
former trial; (5) that the defeated party had no 
opportunity to make the defense, or was prevented from 
doing so by unavoidable accident, or the fraud or 
improper conduct of the other party, without fault on 
his part. (Citations omitted). 
This Court has consistently followed these rules. See, Doty 
v. Town of Cedar Hills, 656 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1982) and cases 
cited therein. 
It is apparent that the trial judge not only found that 
there was no basis to Monte Tipton's claim that he was without 
fault in failing to produce this evidence earlier, but also that 
the evidence did not support Monte Tipton's case. 
The final point urged with respect to Appellant's motion 
for a new trial before the trial judge involved an award of 
fees and costs for Mrs. Tipton's accountant. As noted by 
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her counsel in the Reporter's Transcript (R.T. p. 59, lines 
3-18), the settlement agreement drafted by Appellant provided at 
Par. 21 thereof that a party in default of his/her obligations 
would be liable for all reasonable expenses including attorney's 
fees (R. 13). In light of the fact that the trial court declined 
requests by both parties for attorney's fees, and merely awarded 
the Respondent a fraction of the significant accounting expenses 
she incurred, no abuse of discretion should be found. 
CONCLUSION 
The essence of this appeal is Appellant Monte Tipton's 
inequitable and insupportable attempt to avoid the consequences 
of his legal obligation. Not only has Appellant failed to 
provide this Court with competent factual evidence to permit a 
review of the trial court's actions, the record on appeal 
disproves Appellant's claims of error. Thus, Respondent's 
defenses rise above technicalities, however well merited, as to 
the untimeliness of this appeal, or Appellant's unclean hands. 
Rather, they go to the heart of the legal and equitable re-
lationships between the parties. The findings and orders 
appealed from were sufficient and accurate in every necessary 
respect. Respondent requests that the appeal be denied in toto. 
DATED this IQ> day of OOJVAUJO-JL^ / 1987. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PARKER, McKEOWN & McCONKIE 
Righard B. McKeqwn 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four copies of the above and foregoing 
w^r^y hand delivered by United States mail, postage prepaid, this 
day of A^iu>>*^ , 1987 to the following: 
Peter W. Guyon 
GUYON & HUNTER . 
Attorneys at Law 
1000 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM 
ABBREVIATED CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS AND PLEADINGS 
DATE EVENT/PLEADING REFERENCE 
10-29-78 Celia Sherwood Tipton, now known as Celia 
Demman, and Monte Dee Tipton married. 
08-06-82 Plaintiff and Respondent herein, Celia 
Tipton, filed her Complaint for Divorce. 
10-22-82 Stipulation and Settlement Agreement, pre-
pared by counsel for Appellant Monte Tipton, 
filed for both parties with consent of Celia!s 
counsel. 
32-08-83 Minute Entry of Divorce pursuant to Stipula-
tion made by Judge Bryant H. Croft. 
33-04-83 Findings and Conclusions, drafted by Respon-
dent's Counsel, filed with the Court. 
D3-04-83 Decree of Divorce signed by Judge Croft. 
34-04-83 (Right to Appeal Decree of Divorce expires) 
)9-21-84 Respondent Celia Tipton filed her Motion for 
Order to Show Cause against Monte Tipton for 
failure to comply with the terms of the Decree 
of Divorce. 
.0-29-84 Appellant Monte Tipton filed his Verified 
Motion to Dismiss; Order to Show Cause: For 
Contempt; For Judgment Against Plaintiff: 
And For Other Relief. 
•2-22-85 Appellant Monte Tipton filed his Petition to 
Modify Decree of Divorce. 
Complaint 
for Divorce 
R.2. 
R. 2-6. 
R. 7-14 
R. 15 
R. 16-22. 
R. 23-29. 
(U.R.A.P. 4) 
R. 30-31 
R. 39-45 
R. 49-52 
-a-
03-04-85 Following oral argument, Commissioner Sandra 
Peuler filed written recommendations as to 
all pending motions by all parties. Specifi-
cally, the Commissioner found that Appellant 
should bear the tax liability which in large 
part forms the basis for this appeal. 
04-05-85 Counsel for both parties appeared before Judge 
James S. Sawaya and proffered evidence relative 
to issues in dispute. The issues to be decided 
were agreed upon by stipulation. Documentary 
evidence, and lay and expert testimony, prof-
fered, but not presented to the court. 
34-26-85 Judge Sawaya issued a Memorandum Decision re-
solving all issues presented to him. Counsel 
for Celia Tipton is directed to prepare an Order 
for the Court's signature. 
35-09-85 Findings and Conclusions are signed by Judge 
Sawaya in support of his Memorandum Decision. 
)5-09-85 Judge Sawaya signed and entered an Order fin-
alizing his Memorandum Decision. 
)5-2 0-85 Counsel for Appellant filed a Motion for New 
Trial; to Take Additional Testimony; To Amend 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; and 
to Amend Judgment. (Time to appeal tolled) 
)9-23-85 Counsel for both parties appear before Judge 
Sawaya to argue Appellant's Rule 59 Motion 
for New Trial, etc. 
>9-2 3-85 Judge Sawaya signed and entered an order deny-
ing Appellant's Motion for New Trial, etc. 
The order was entered by the clerk in the 
docket sheet. Copies were mailed by the clerk 
*to all counsel on 09-24-85. 
R. 59-60 
Reporter's 
Transcript 
of Proceed-
ings pp. 
1-50. 
R. 110-113 
R. 114-118 
R. 119-122 
R. 123-130 
TJ.R.A.P. 4b 
Reporter's 
transcript 
pp. 51-60 
R. 136 
0-2 3-85 (Right to Appeal Judge Sawaya's Order of 
of 09-23-85 expires) 
4-19-86 Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal from 
the Order of Judge Sawaya of 09-23-85. 
(Notice untimely). 
U.R.A.P. 4 
R. 144 
-b-
05-20-86 Counsel for Respondent Celia Tipton filed a R. 149 
second Order, signed by Judge Sawaya, dupli-
cating the Order of Judge Sawaya of 9-23-85. 
06-13-86 Appellant filed his Amended Notice of Appeal R. 151 
from both Judge Sawaya's personally prepared 
order of 09-23-85 and the redundant Order pre-
pared by Respondent's Counsel of 05-2 0-8 6. 
Notice untimely. 
-c-
